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By Letter of 8 November 1984 the Political Affairs Committee requested 
authorization to draw up a report on political relations between the 
european Community and the United States of America. 
At its sitting of 14 January 1985 the European Parliament authorized 
the Political Affairs committee to draw up a report on this subject. 
At its meeting of 1 March 1985 the Political Affairs Committee 
appointed Lord Bethell rapporteur. 
The following motions for resolution were referred to the Political 
Affairs Committee by Parliament, pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of 
Procedure, at its sittings of: 
9 October 1984, motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Ephremidis and 
others on the dangers for Europe implicit in the resolution passed 
by the Republican Congress in the USA and the behaviour of President 
Reagan (Doc. 2-551/84); 
23 October 1984, motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Glinne on the 
implementation of the McCarran-Walter Act in the United States 
(Doc. 2-741/84). 
The committee considered the draft report at its meetings of 
28 january 1987, 26 March 1987, 29 April 1987, 25 May 1987 and 24 June 1987. 
At the last meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution as a whole 
by 30 votes to O with 4 abstentions. 
The following took part in the vote: Mr ERCINI, chairman; 
Sir Peter VANNECK (vice-chairman); Lord BETHELL, rapporteur; Mr AIGNER 
(deputizing for Mrs Lenz), Mr ANTONIOZZI, Mr BALFE (deputizing for Mr Lomas), 
Mr BLUMENFELD, Mr DE GUCHT, Mr DELOROZOY (deputising for Mr Bettiza), 
Mr FITZGERLAD (deputizing for Mr Coste-Floret), Mr FLANAGAN, Mr FORD, 
Mr GLINNE, Mr HABSBURG, Mr HANSCH, Mr KEPSCH, Mr van der LEK, Mr NEWENS, 
Mr PELIKAN (deputizing for Mr Amadei), Mr PENDERS, Mr PFLIMLIN, Mr PIQUET, 
Mr PIRKL (deputizing for Mr Estgen), Mr PLASKOVITIS, Mr POETTERING, 
Mr PRAG (deputizing for Lord Douro), Mr ROBLES PIQUER (deputizing fer 
Mr Perinat Elio), Mr SABY (deputizing for Mr Jospin), Mr SALZER (deputizing 
for Mr Iodice), Mr SEGRE (deputizing for Mr Galuzzi), Mr TAYLOR (deputizing 
for Mr Romualdi), Mr TOKSVIG, Mr TZOUNIS, Mr WALTER and Mr WELSH. 
The report was tabled on 30 June 1987. 
The deadlin~ for tabling amendments to this report will be indicated 
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The Political Affairs Committee hereby submits to the European Parliament 
the following motion for a resolution, together with explanatory statement: 
MOTION_FOR_A_RESOLUTION 
on political relations between the European Community and the United States 
of America 
The_Euro~ean_Parliament, 
- Having regard to the following motions for resolution: 
- motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Ephremidis and others on the 
dangers for Europe implicit in the resolution passed by the Republican 
Congress in the USA and the behaviour of President Reagan (~oc. 2-551/84) 
- motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Glinne on the implementation of 
the McCarran-Walter Act in the United States (Doc. 2-741/84) 
- Having regard to the report of the Political Affairs Committee (Doc. A 2-105/87), 
A. Bearing in mind the great political, economic, cultural, historical, legal 
and religious ties that have existed for many centuries between Europe and 
North America, ties which have remained and in many areas strengthened 
since the United States was founded; 
B. Noting that the close links between the United States and the twelve 
European Community countries today are based on our joint commitment to 
pluralist democracy and to the civil, political, economic, cultural and 
social rights of the individual; 
c. Recognising the great contribution made by the United States to the 
preservation and restoration of European freedom, especially in the struggle 
against racism and fascism during 1939-45, and in the economic reconstruction 
of devastated western Europe after the Second World War; all of which 
strengthens the United States' and the European Community's joint determination 
~o preserve peace and freedom in Europe; 
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:1 • 1~ecocinising that 1n certain politicdl and economic areas disagreements 
Jnd conflicts of interest have led to problC'ms in thl' (C-lJS rel.it ionship 
.rnd that thf'se rtisa(Jref'ments are reflected in the views of substant i;il 
·;ections of tht' publi1, t,oth i11 the 1,.,. .. 111•,111 Cnmm1111i1y .111.I 111 tlw 
United Stati>s; 
Recognising that many of the great scourges of our age, such as terr·urism, 
druqs and AIDS, are of particular concern to the world's two main industrialised 
entities, the United States and the European Community; 
t. fxpressing its concern at the apparent growth of protectionism in 
American political thinking, f'SpPcially in the United States Congress, 
G. Aw,lrP that the p,:,rform;ince of the U.S. economy and the level of the U.S. 
currency have a profound effect on the economic growth of other countries 
including the European Commvnity, as \./ell as on the indebtedness of the 
Third \.Jorl<i ;md that any recession in the United States \.IOuld hit developing 
countries esppciallt hard; 
H. Noting that t.he c;har:p fall in the US currency, mainly due to the huge 
foreign trade deficit, means that there is a need to consolidate the 
EMS and to r.onsider, with the American authorities, a broader role 
for the ECU in international transactions_; 
1. Confirms its belief in the need for a close political relationship between 
the European Community and the United States. 
2. Reqrets the fact that certain politir.;il problems, 1n particular over 
Furopean security, international terrorism and on United States policy 
in Central. AmPrir,1, as well ;ic; rPrt,1in important er.onomic: coiiflicts of 
interest have arisen over the past f €w years. 
~- f~presc;ec; its df:'PP roncern at the q,-eat stockpile<; of n11cle;ir, chemical 
and biological weapons presently hPld by the two military blocs as wt>ll as 
till' vt•ry hiqh IPvPI of cnnv('nt inn,~1 for<:C'S now deployeci in Furore; 
'lelcomec; the proposals m:ide for a reduction of the nuclear we::ipnnr.. and 
hopes that wec;tern t=urope ::ind the IJniterl '>tates wilt work togP.thf>r closely so 
ac; to rP.mO\IP the,;e rlange1,; tn F11rope;u1 c:ec:11rity, consultinq ;:ind rleriding on 
the ha<;ic; of e(lual p;;rtnPrc;hir. 
'· IJr,to-; tl1e Uniteci St,,res' a,~,; d,P F,.,0r,Pan (ommunity's joint inti>r·est in the 
rrc1r,0mii: ;inci ,:;oriai rJ<>velnpment nf I Pntral anci South America ac; the best w.Jy 
of p.-rw,riti11q d<>mncr;,ry nv,.,, ,Ji.-t-'>tn,,:;hir, in this imrorti'nt r<>qion; ronfirms 
th<> frimm,,nity'c:: rnmmitmPnt hnth tn thP (ontadora initiative and to the 
,·1t1 Jn<:;, prf>f"f>~"'.: 1•11,itr<: thP (11'llrl'IH,ity to C:Ommit m()f(> (j,i;inrial rP.SOUrCeS 
tn1.1.,r,1· ... ,){'}1i,.,,i,,q 1t1ir: ,·,1,it 'lltrl 
r. r F 111 " 20f-./ f in. 
' 
5. Regrets the confusion that has arisen in the western world as a result of 
revelations that the United States negotiated secretly with Iran and gave 
Iran arms in exchange for the release of hostages; hopes that the United 
States and the Twelve will consult urgently, using all available channels 
including the Trevi Group and US experts in the field, to find a common 
position on international terrorism and the seizing of hostages by 
paramilitary groups, concerting their eftorts so as to achieve the release 
of all such hostages irrespective of their nationality. 
6. Invites the United States to consider the effect on the outside world, 
especially the Third World, of its volatile interest and currency rates; 
expresses a willingness to cooperate with the United States so as to 
eliminate this problem. 
7. Regrets that the European Community's political cooperation machinery does 
not yet allow the European side to speak with one voice in matters of 
security; hopes that an improvement in such cooperation will result in 
more effective consultation between the US arid Europe in security matters 
and an equitable sharing of the burden of western Europe's defense. 
8. Draws attention to the serious problem, shared by both the European 
Community and the United States, of surplus food production, believing that 
the framework of the new GATT round offers some hope ~f bringing supply 
and demand of agricultural surpluses into a better balance. 
9. Calls on the United States Congress not to prejudice the outcome of the GATT 
r-ound by adopting protectionist lr,qislation. 
10. Emphasises the importance of resolving trade disputes between the United 
States and the EC in a spirit of goodwill, thereby making sure that the 
ties that bt~d the western alliance remain unbroken. 
11. Notes the close cooperation with the Twelve in the context of the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe; invites the United States government to 
bear this factor in mind, especially during the present Vienna review, and 
to seek common western positions on CSCE by consultation with the European 
Community. 
12. Urges the European Community and the United.States to consult most closely 
on questions of human rights, especially within CSCE, of which both the 
European Community and the United States are signatories. 
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13. Notes that while a growing number of countries, including all the 
European Community Member States, either have abolished, or no longer 
apply the death penalty, most states in the United States remain 
committed to capital punishment; expresses its deep concern that during 
the past year the number of prisoners on 'death row' has been the 
highest on record, that in 26 states persons under 18 can be sentenced 
to death and that evidence accepted by the Supreme Court in the 
Mccleskey versus Kemp case shows that the race of the victim or of 
the defendant could be a factor when death sentences are passed. 
14. Welcomes the enaction by the United States Congress of a law providing for 
a pilot programme of non-immigrant visa reciprocity; expresses the hope 
that, in due course, all law-abiding European Community citizens will be 
able to visit the United States without visas. 
15. Expresses its satisfaction at the development of the twice-yearly 
meetings between Members of the Europea~ Parliament and the US House 
of Representatives; hopes that, from time to time, joint meetings of 
European Parliament and House specialist committees can take place to deal 
with specific problems, especially in agriculture and monetary affairs as 
well as <on a political basis) in such urgent matters as terrorism, drugs 
and AIDS; looks forward to the day when the European Parliament will have 
meetings, on a similar basis, with members of the United States Senate. 
16. Instructs the President to forward this resolution to the Council, the 
Commission, the Twelve meeting in Political Cooperation and to the Congress 
and Administration of the United States of America. 
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-B~---- ------------~- -·· ------------ -----
. _ _ _ Ex.eLANAIORL..SIA T EMRI.L. __ 
In 1984 Mr Klaus Hansch noted in his report to the European Parliament that 
"the relationship between the Community and the United States has run into 
difficulties ••• " His explanatory note mentioned in particular the effect 
of high American interest rates and the value of the dollar on the European 
and Third World economies. He was critical of the "conservatis1n"· of the 
Reagan administration with its proud proclamations about American values 
and its "idee fixe" about the Soviet "evil empire". He also pointed out 
a growing imbalance of effort in the Atlantic alliance and a difference of 
view as to the value of detente. 
He quoted an opinion poll conducted by the Herald Tribu.!'~ (November 29th, 
1983) which showed a marked reduction overall in the percentage of west 
Europeans who see cooperation with the United States as the basis of their 
security. The reduction in the German Federal Republic, from 53 to 34 
percent, was especially significant. There were also important falls in 
France and Italy, from 25 to 19 percent and from 27 to 22 percent respectively. 
The past two years have brought further complications. Americans are inclined 
to blame western Europe for their economic difficulties, firstly in steel 
and then, when a US/EC agreement on steel was concluded in 1986, in 
agriculture. (US exports to Spain were hit badly when Spain joined the 
Cr,mmunity in January 1986). 
In 1985 the US overseas trade deficit was $148 billion. Their deficit with 
the Community was $23 billion. 
A New York Times opinion poll has produced the alarming conclusion that 
n1ore than half the American people see overseas trade as "a bad thing". 
The United States has withdrawn from UNESCO and cut its contribution to the 
Uni. ted Nations budget from 25 to 20 percent, thus arousing talk of the 
"sunset" of its internationalism, 
Most dramatic of all was the American reaction to alleged European weakness, 
or even disloyalty, in the !ace of international terrorism. They were shocked 
by European cri ticis.m of the AchJlle Lauro passenger liner and they were 
disgusted by some European countries' refusal to provide overflight facilities 
for their air raids on Tripoli and Benghazi. 
A large number of west Europeans (though probably not a majority) have been 
equally shocked by some aspects of American policy. True, America:tt interest 
and dollar rates have fallen, so removjng a source of instability in 
European finance. However, complications in the poUtical aronu continue 
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to cause problem~. 
There is \'lidespraad Em:'cpei,.,, scspt:J;cis:m B.b0ut Pl·esitl.e:r.n Rep,gan 1 !3 Strategic 
Defence Ini Uative, res~nt:mo~t t1,i;.t it waf: ru11101rnced in 198~i wlthout 
consultation with allies anti !der that 1t may dastabilioe relntions with the 
Soviet Union, providiag an at leaPt partiul defence for the United States 
but leaving western Europe ,;.npr0tec ted, 
Nicaragua is another problem. Europeans of the Left see a hypocrisy in 
Ameri.can denunciation of terrorism whon t t is jo:lned wi '1:.h American financial 
support for "co1.a,ter-rov:)l11ti.0,rn:,,-r'' fo:r.ces :tn a neighbour:l.n.g country, These 
two issues, SDI and Nicaragua, ~0re the trigger for the demonstrations by 
some members of the European FarliamHr,t in Strasbourg against the US President 
on May 8th, 1985" 
A further American hypocrisy e.me:rges from the reveJ.atiun that rr.emhers of 
the Administration. have bargained with th-a Iranian g:overi.'iment in. an effort 
to secure the relea~eof hostages held ~u Beirut, &o violating the principle 
they have urged so strongly and publicly upcn European governments in the 
past that the western allies should under no ctrcunistances negotiate with 
terrorists, The United States is perceived to have fallen from grace over 
this issue and not lived up to its public pronounceir.ents, so encouraging 
European governments to violate the principle also, The German government's 
reaction to the taking of German hostages in Beirut, in order to prevent 
the extradition o:f a terrorist suspect, is nn example of this. 
The State of the Alliance 
~--~--.. ·---
The North Atlantic alliance was born out of the United States's pact with 
Great Britain against Nazi Germany in 1941-45 and then, after a short 
interval of semi-isolationism, out of a decision by Preeidont Truman that 
it was not in his country's interest to allow communiRt doctrine or Soviot 
nrntod for co to sproud further fl'-!l'ORH Europo,, Tho Trwnan. DGc trino, pro,:la l r:iod 
in March 1947, was :first put to the t,._ist Jn Greeco, Commun1st forcei:, were 
defeated with American and Dri t:l.sh !:0lr>, The Marshall Pla:1'1 was launched a 
year later and the North Atlantic Treaty Org~nisation was created in 1949. 
Historians may view it as something of~ freak that this al11ance has 
survived for nearly 40 years, uninterrupted by the plurality of political 
views that exists in its ever-growing numbei: of :member states, including 
openly pro-Soviet communist pa:,:-ttes and sometimes anti-American socialist 
parties. 'I'X'J'c!, there was the French wl thdrawal from NA'£0' s fntegrated 
military structure, but thiR can be seen now not as a r1~ture but as a 
variant, which conventefitly c,ffercd Spain a precendent fox iti'.l chosen type 
of NATO accessi.ono 
The aJ.l iance rema:i.H!', f>Jnda:mel'l.talJ;; ~101,,id, brl political problems of the past 
few years make it for the first timA conceivable thRt serious fissqres ~ay 
dovelop in Anme of Lhe main µfllnr~ thnt support it. 
Americans continue to complain that thBy beqr too much of the hurden of 
Europe'n defe:nc,~., I:til J.985 th(-: 1J:u~ltcr! t'>trtteH tq;,e.~,t ~;266 ... 6 hllJlon 01, defence;-
PF 111.2CJ6/fir:. 
6.5 percent of its GDP. Half this expenditure is estimated to be NATO-
related. By contrast NATO's European members spent $83.5 billion altogether, 
about 3.8 percent of their ~otal GDP. 
It is argued by the American side that western Europe, which has a similar 
population and larger GDP than the Soviet Union and her allies, should by 
now be in a better position to defend itself,on its own, without relying 
so heavily on a distant ally. And the fact that Europeans are increasingly 
critical of American policy, that some are even anxious to close down 
American nuclear bases, serves only to strengthen this American point of 
view. 
At the June 1986 meeting between US Congressmen and European Parliament 
members in Santa Fe, New Mexico, Representative Bereuter asked the 
inevitable question, "Is 40 years long enough?". The Truman Doctrine and 
NATO were conceived when Britain was poverty stricken and much of 
Continental Europe devastated by war. The American guarantee was the only 
way to protect a puny and helpless western Europe from the massive Soviet 
army. Today we have the Europea~ Community, rich and on its way to a 
European union. Is it not time to renegotiate the transatlantic 
relationship? 
It was made clear in our Santa Fe talks that any American proposal to 
"bring the boys hollle" would be warmly welcomed by many on the European i-, 
Left, including the British Labour Party. Whole or partial military 
withdrawal, they believe, would reduce American influence in Europe, 
economic as well as political, so making socialist goals easier to achieve 
and peace easier to preserve. Americans reply that, if ever western 
Europe were to request any such withdrawal, the United States would 
instantly oblige. 
For the moment, though, and so long as Conservative governments stay in 
power in Germany and the United Kingdom, there is little sign that either 
side will make any such suggestion. In spite of Americans' belief that 
the cost of NATO is unfairly spread, proposals for withdrawal such as 
those of Senator Mike Mansfield in the 1960s are not being laid before 
the US Congress. 
Nuclear Disa:rmament·in Europe 
Many Europeans believe that the US government is too rigid and negative 
in its talks with the Soviet Union on arms control, especially on nuclear 
11reapons in Europe. This feeling, fuelled by President Reagan's reference 
to a possible limited nuclear war in Europe and his joking instruction on 
American television to "bomb Russia now", has given rise to political 
tension. 
Until recently the debate was at its sharpest over the deployment o1 
Cruise and Pershing missiles. The campaign against the neutron bomb had 
been successful - to the United States's irritation. The campaign against 
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Cruise and Pershing :tailed) however, and the:re is little agitation for 
their removal. It was noted with inter.est that the Soviet Union, having 
broken off arms limitation talks in apparent disgust after deployment, 
rejoined the talks as soon as this once again suited their convenience. 
As a result of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachevts letter to President Reagan 
dated January 15, 1986, on balanced arms reduction in Europe, the President's 
special adviser Paul Nitze toured west European capitals to discuss the 
reply. (This move was welcomed as an example of better American consultation 
with European allies.) One of the vnriants put forward by Mr Nitze involved 
the removal of Cruise missiles from Britain and the Netherlands. American 
negotiators were surprised at the vehemence with which both European 
governments rejected any such idea. The notion of reversing a decision so 
agonisingly implemented was intolerable. 
The suspicion nevertheless remains in Europe that there is one important 
current in the formation of the United States's foreign policy, prominent 
among whom is the so-called "prince of darkness", Deputy Secretary for 
Defense Richard Perle, which is opposed on principle to almost any agreement 
with Moscow on arms control. The Soviet Union would violate any such 
agreement, these hard-liners allegedly believe, just as they violate Salt II, 
a treaty which has outlived its usefulness. Furthermore, agreement would 
stifle American enterprise (which Russia cannot match) in the development 
of new weapons, especially defensive weapons, so wounding the American 
side in a conflict which cannot ever be fully resolved so long as the Soviet 
Union retains its present character, a conflict which the United States 
can and must eventually win. 
It follows from this hypothesis that Mr Gorbachev's reasonable offers are 
being blocked by Mr Reagan's intransigence. And the same fate is likely 
to befall the Soviet offer put forward in June 1986, under which in return 
for substantial reductions in Soviet missiles the American side would, 
wi.thout abandoning SDI completely, commit itself to the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile treaty and to non-deplbyment of any strategic defence system for 
a number of years. 
The situation, 1i t is suggested, is therefore very dangerous. There will 
be an arms race, particularly of missiles in the European theatre. Europe 
will become, even more than previously, the area where the two superpowers 
flex their military muscles. And it will be President Reagan's fault. 
The Americans and other west European supporters (still a majority) protest 
that Mr Gorbachev 's frequent and loudly proclaimed offers are merely old 
wine in new bottles, designed to sow division among the western allies 
rather than to provide the basis for true negotiation. They point out 
that, whereas the United States has 572 nuclear warheads deployed in western 
Europe, the Soviet Unionttas:270 SS20s and 120 SS4s in Europe, a total of 
1170 warheads, as well as 171 SS20s (513 warheads) in Asia that could 
easily be moved to Europe, and that all these are in sites much easier to 
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defend through the Soviet bloc's draconian system ot internal security. 
President Reagan's friends point out that towards the e~d of the 1970s 
their weapons systems were obsolescent, no match for the Soviet systems 
(for instance the SS20s in the European theatre) that were already in 
place. Ammunition bunkers were empty, ships needed an overhaul and there 
had been a net loss in aircraft. The President, assuming power in January 
1981, did no more than put right these deficiencies, making sure that 
American weapons did not go out of date before new ones were available. 
He did not, as had been alleged, go on a military spending spree. In 
fact the United States has today 8,000 fewer nuclear weapons than it did 
in the 1970s. Furthermore, deployment of Cruise and Pershing was 
encouraged by many European governments and the decision to deploy was 
taken by President Carter, 
The argument involves theories that cannot be proved. Which superpower 
is showing more goodwill, more readiness to compromise, more appreciation 
of the seriousness of the arms control issue and of the need to halt the 
build-up of weapons of mass destruction? Many Europeans, especially the 
Left, feel that Americans are approaching this, clearly the most 
important issue of all, since it involves mankind's survival, with 
insufficient tact and delicacy. 
Geopolitically, the European Community's position is precarious, It 
is the •hip betwee11 the two rook•, a 11:mall 1.ppend•1• attached to th• 
bulk of Soviet-controlled Europe and the even more massive bulk of Soviet 
Asia. It is nervous of the fact that it is in the Soviet Union's thrall, 
unsure of its ability eventually to build up an independent security and 
.118anwhile (from time to time) resentful of its reliance on the United States. 
Soviet conventional forces, no more than a few hundred kilometres from its 
industrial centres, are overwhe1ming and the idea of defending Europe's 
territory by the use of nuclear weapons is scarcely thinkable, given the 
density of its population and the proximity of Soviet nuclear bases, ready 
to launch a counterstrike. On the other hand, its people are keen to 
preserve the system of government based on democratic pluralism that they 
share with the American peoplev If they are to succeed in this, they 
must find the right mixture of strength of purpose and wise caution. 
Americans and Europeans must know that it is a question not of choosing 
between the two, but of combining both, 
Your rapporteur believes that confusions between the American and European 
positions on arms control result from differences of tactic rather than 
of principle. Arllls negotiations involve bargaining and bluff. The 
western side must therefore, wh1ile showing its determination, be careful 
not to provoke the Russian bear so harshly as to risk a cataclysm. 
Differences of view over how to tackle this problem safely as well as 
effectively should not be exaggerated, 
There are some in the CoJlllllunity who seek greater Soviet influence, a shift 
towards neutrality or even a change of allegiance, but they remain a 
minority, The Community institutions and the governments of member states 
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are still resolved to work with the United States to achieve an al'llls 
control agreement that will preserve European freedoms as well as security. 
The announcement of President Reagan's initiative on strategic defence was 
greeted in western Europe with varying degrees of scepticism and disapproval. 
The initiative had been laUJtched without consultation with western allies. 
This apparent snub sharpened west European suggestions at the time that 
it was lU.:ely to destabilise relations with the Soviet Union and accelerate 
the arms race. 
It was then said that SDI was unrealistic, as unreal as "star wars". Even 
if American technology found it possible to build a shield or protective 
"bubble" over the United States, it was said, the chances were that Soviet 
technology would find a way of penetrating it, such is the inbuilt 
advantage enjoyed by the aggressor. 
Furthermore, SDI offered a defence only against high-trajectory missiles, 
which were to be shot out of the sky with satellite-based lasers. Where 
did this leave western Europe, which is threatened by intermediate-range 
missiles as well as the aircraft-carried bomb and the nuclear shell? 
There seemed little hope of the promised "mutually assured survival", 
especially as far as Europe was concerned. 
President Reagan's astonishing proposal to share SDI technology with the 
Soviet Union, so providing both superpowers with strategic defence: and, 
eventually, making the nuclear missile obsolete seemed equally unrealistic 
as well as a special threat to western Europe. For a moment the President 
seemed to be agreeing with Mr Gorbachev's idea of total nuclear disarmament. 
Was not this naive? Which superpower would destroy the last nuclear 
weapon? 
And where would this leave western Europe, a territory which, we have been 
led to believe, can be defended only by the threat of nuclear retaliation 
to an assault on its eastern frontiers? SDI amd mutually assured survival 
would mean the abandonment of the Community to the tender mercy of the 
Soviet Union's huge conventional forces, which performed so effectively 
in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. 
Three years later •any of these problems have been clarified. It is now 
conceded that SDI, even it successfully researched, built and deployed, 
would not free the world tro~ the nuclear threat entirely. It would need 
to develop a further dimension before it was effective against low-trajectory 
missiles such as Cruise or against the bomber aircraft. It it unlikely 
to be effective against short-range missiles (SS21, SS22 and SS23) or 
nuclear artillery, or the man with the bomb in his suitcase. 
SDI could defend the West against strategic or intermediate missiles, 
including SS20s, so defending western Europe to a certain extent. The 
launching of any such missile would, if SDI were operational, become 
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illlHlediately detectible, because of the intense heat generated as soon as 
it is fired. The objective would then be to destroy the missile by laser 
technology a few seconds after the launch, before it had even left hostile 
territory. The "dome" would thus· be bull t not over America or Europe, 
but over Soviet-controlled territory. The Soviet Union would be restricted 
to those low-speed warhead-carriers that could fly under the dome's lip. 
Such restriction has its advantages. The high-trajectory ballistic missile 
reaches it target quickly and h the:t'eiore ideally suited to the pre-emptive 
strike. It is the aggressor's weapon, the one that the West must fear 
most and work hardest to neutralise. Furthermore, it is now clear that 
SDI is not as destabilising as many Europeans originally thought. It 
could never provide perfect defence, so giving the American side nuclear 
hegemony. An American leader recently remarked, "If you believe in 
mutually assured destruction, don't panic, it's not going to go away." 
The US Administration believes that SDI is essential not only to 
strengthen American defence in the face of Soviet research in the same 
area, the military use of laser technology, but also to make an agreement 
on al'Jlls control more acceptable and likely to come to pass, 
It was only the threat of US progress on SDI, they feel, that brought the 
Soviet side back to the negotiating table after the deployment of Cruise 
and Pershing. And only by playing the SDI "card" can an agreement be 
reached which the US Senate is likely to ratify. In fact, generally 
speaking, they say, any agreement negotiated by a more liberal administration 
would have a hard passage through the Senate. The Soviet Union would 
therefore be well advised to negotiate seriously under Mr Reagan's 
presidency, rather than waiting for a gentler American leader. And the 
west Europeans, i! they want to see an agreement that does not suffer the 
fate of Salt II, should think in like terms. 
SDI, in short, would bring for the first time an element of defensive 
capability into the American armoury. The United States would be in a 
position not only to retaliate with its own missiles, but also to block 
most of the enemy's. It could never be a perfect defence, but it could 
perhaps make unnecessary a massive programme of new offensive weapons, 
for instance a system of mobile Intercont:b1elt'tal Ballistic Missiles. 
It is also argued that Europe should encourage its own scientists to 
participate in the programme. In this way Europe could qualify for 
contracts, with the possibility of commercially valuable spin-offsj,and 
gain a place at the table where SDl's future is discussed. 
On the other hand, there May be political objection on the US's part, 
already expressed in an amendment put forward by Senator John Glenn, to 
the investment of large a11ounts of SDI money overseas and one can foresee 
argwnents between European firms and the Pentagon over the ownership of 
any technical discovery. Nor should Europe forget its own investment in 
the Eureka project which, if it can be strengthened, will provide for 
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high-technology cooperation in defence among the Twelve rather than with 
a third country. 
·1 ' . 
Your rapporteur belie~es ihat the EC should react cautiously to the SDI 
project. While it makes no sense for Europe simply to condemn it and 
stand aside while it proceeds, it would also be wrong for Europe to 
abandon its own efforts in the higher reaches of defence technology merely 
in the hope of contracts, which the senior partner in the alliance may or 
may not see fit to grant. 
Above all, the Twelve should seek every opportunity to discuss with the 
US the full political implications of SDI, so as to ensure that west 
European security is not put in jeopardy. 
TERRORISM: Europe's problem4 ·America's fury 
Throughout most of 1986 it would have been hard to exaggerate the American 
government's and people's anger at what they saw as western Europe's 
indifterence, cowardice, or even disloyalty in the face of Libyan-sponsored 
terrorism. 
The United States believes that the fact of Colonel Gaddhafi's involvement 
in international terrorism is undeniable. The Abu Nidal group, guilty 
of many atrocities including the attack on the Israeli ambassador in London 
and the recent highjacking of an Egyptian airliner to Malta, an episode 
in which many lives were lost, has its main base in Libya. 
It was Libya that provided passports for the terrorists who carried out 
the massacres at Rome and Vienna airports. British policewoman Yvonne 
Fletcher was murdered by a gunman inside London's Libyan Poeple's Bureau. 
Terrorists who bombed a discoteque in West Berlin in April 1986, causing 
two deaths, received instructions from Libya by radio. 
AJnericans note that international terrorism is euro-centric. Its most 
frequent outbursts are on or around the Mediterranean. And it is here 
that terrorists claim the largest number of American lives as well as 
European. It is therefore here that the scourge must be tackled. 
The United States believes that it is not enough to reduce the numbers of 
staff in Libyan People's Bureaux in the Coffllllunity. "Break into a People's 
Bureau and you'll find it full of plastic explosive and detonators," one 
senior US official told ffle. They should therefore all be closed and 
Libyan Arab Airlines, whose involvement in terrorism has also been proved, 
should be banned from Community territory or airspace. 
Americans were contemptuous of the original French decision (for which 
France was later to pay a terrible price) to release terrorist George 
Abdullah and of the Italian decision to release the main highjacke~ of 
the Achille Lauro cruise ship, from which a crippled American passenger 
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was murdered. US Congressmen note that the European Par~iaJnent voted to 
condemn the American action that resulted in the highjackers being captured. 
They find the vote incomprehensible. 
Their incomprehension turns to disgust when they consider the French and 
Spanish refusal to allow F-111 bombers to overfly either country during 
the April 12th, 1986, raid on Tripoli and Benghazi. They have vivid 
memories of maps of the route their aircraft were forced to fly - a 
looping detour from British bases into the Atlantic, round Spain, through 
the Straits of Gibraltar and down the Mediterranean. 
The long flight, they surmise, made the F-111 crews tired and less 
efficient. It may well have resulted in Gaddhafi being alerted as to 
what was happening and be part of the reason why one of the F-llls was 
shot down, with the loss of the crew, and why the raid's main objective, 
Gaddhafi' s phy.sical elimination, was not achieved. In short, they blame 
France and Spain for the mission's partial failure and for the loss of 
two American lives. 
In June 1986 US Congressmen explained to the EP delegation that it was 
American "disgust" at Europe's approach to the terrorist problem, rather 
than any fear of attack, that was discouraging tourists from visiting 
European resorts. What they wanted from Europe was quite modest, they 
pointed out. Was it really so difficult for west European governments, 
supposedly allies, to fulfil these few American requests? 
They want the Collll!lunity to close the People's Bureaux, to ban Libyan 
airlines, to institute some control or surveillance of Middle East diplomatic 
baggage, to pool anti-terrorist intelligence, tighten up airport security 
and negotiate clear extradition treaties covering all acts of violence, 
irrespective of any political motive in the crime. They want the West to 
take the lead in outlawing terrorism by international agreement, just as 
chemical and bacteriological weapons are outlawed. The agreement would 
make it plain that an act of violence against the person.'1was never 
justifiable through politics or ideology. 
They believe that some Community governments (Greece and France, for 
instance) have made tacit agreeJDents with terrorist groups, exchanging 
murderers in their jails for thei.r countrymen held hostage in Beirut or 
offering diplomatic help in exchange for immunity from attack. This 
practice, they believe, has the effect of merely moving terrorist activity 
from one CoBllllunity country to another. They want the practice stopped. 
Above all they dislike what they see as European toleration of terrorism 
in exchange for conunercial opportunity, in Middle East countries, or (still 
worse) in order to pick up the business of those like the United States 
which take a tougher line. 
As for the Libyan raid, they have no regrets. It did not, as many 
Ei,n,opeaasprophesied, provoke any massive retaliation. It id not cause the 
entire Middle East to rally to Gaddhafi's side. On the contrary, it caused 
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Gaddhafi to lose face, diminishing his influence both: at holl)e and abroad. 
It was there:l!ore a "surgical cut" which, all in all, caused good rather 
than haMi, They expect their European allies to undel'stand this, to 
applaud and support them :to:r their bold leadership in the fight against 
terrorism. And they are pleased by the idea that France, as a result of 
the recent Paris bomb outrages, is beginning to come round to their point 
of view. 
The European CoJlllllunity would by a large majority agree with the United 
States about the need !or much greater cooperation in the western world 
against the terrorists. There are however many in Europe who do not 
accept the simple American analysis of the problem, and of the measures 
needed to cure it, as outlined above, 
Many feel that President Reagan has become obsessed with Liyba, so that 
he exaggerates the evils of Colonel Gaddhafi to the exclusion of all the 
rest. Others believe that the United States, by supporting the Israeli 
cause so strongly and unwaveringly, has added fuel to Arab terrorism's 
flames. 
Libyan-sponsored terrorisllJ,. it is suggested, is not the great menace to 
the United States that American leaders would have us believe. In 1983 
there were 271 Americans killed in terrorist incidents, almost all of 
them the US· marines bombed to death in one terrible Beirut explosion. 
In other recent years, though, the nwnber of Americans killed by terrrorists 
has been small: ten in 1980, five in 1981, seven in 1982, eleven in 1984 
and 23 in 1985. And by no means all of these deaths can be laid at 
Gaddhafi's door. 
Of course terrorists must be dealt with, but is it wise to rouse the 
entire American nation and call western Europe to arms against so puny 
an assassin, expecially when more than 20,000 people eve~y year are killed 
by murderers inside the United States and an even larger number on the 
roads? Where is America's sense of priorities? Many Europeans see at 
the base of the anti-Gaddhafi crusade not so much anger at the loss of 
innocent life as an expression of wounded national pride, irritation at 
the fact that a small-scale dictator can so publicly - and apparently with 
impunity - tweak the American eagle's tail feathers. 
Other Europeans detect a hypocrisy in the American approach. Has the 
United States the moral right to condemn terrorism, at the same time 
supplying arms and equipment to the Nicaraguan "contras" and the Afghan 
llJUjahedfri?' So confusion starts and unanswerable questions begin to be 
asked. Are the African National Congress terrorists? Are the mujahedin 
terrorists? Or are they freedom fighters? The result is a mixing of 
moral principle and political taste which, in some Europeans' eyes, 
muddies the purity and clarity of the American case. 
American officialdom answers this challenge by pointing out that the 
armed struggles in Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua are "aimed at 
repressive totalitarian governments while operating on a strictly local 
basis", They seek to distinguish between international terrorism, which 
- 18 - PE 111.206/fin. 
the whole western world ought to unite to destroy, and local outrages 
which should be dealt with by local security forces only. 
Among such "local" groups they would list the Red Brigades in Italy, the 
Red Army Faction in GeTlllany, the Basque "ETA" group in Spain and the Irish 
Republican Army. Their position is that they oppose these groups, since 
they are aimed at governments of their allies, but they do not rally the 
world against them. 
This distinction, conveniently for some US. Congressmen and Senators, 
relegates the "local" struggle against such groups as the IRA to the 
second line of American priority, this in spite of the cross-border 
dimension of the IRA's murderous attacks, which have taken place not 
only in Britain and Ireland, but also in the Netherlands, Belgium and 
other countries. 
The ·,T,JS. Administration's distinction between international and local 
terrorism is thus seen.,by many as a political convenience, rather than 
as a matter of principle, and the separation of terrorists from freedom 
fighters appears merely as a value judgement based on the expediency of 
the moment, Scepticism of this kind is strengthened by suggestions that, 
for reasons of American national interest, two more anti-Marxist 
resistance groups, UNITA in Angola and Prince Sihanouk's forces in 
Cambodia, will be receiving American finance and equipment. 
Briefly, then, the European response to America's call for solidarity 
against Gaddhafi and other sponsors of terrorism is along the lines of 
the usual political divide. Centre and Right tendencies, which presently 
predominate in nine of the twelve EC governments and are naturally 
inclined to support our main ally, back strong American action against 
international terrorisro. The Paris bombings and the Hindawi case have 
lessened such differences of opinion as emerged, for instance, over the 
Achille Lauro affair and the Libyan air raid. 1'hose, such as your 
rapporteur, who are not convinced of the purity of the American case in 
ideological terms, nevertheless believe that western Europe, in order 
to protect its security and alliances, should form a more effective 
anti-terrorist policy in cooperation .with the United States. 
The Left, anxious to distance themselves from President Reagan's policies 
generally, condemned him over these two acts in particular. 1'his point 
of view prevailed in several recent European Parliament votes and would 
manifest itself again if the United States were to launch another powerful 
armed initiative. (The EP as presently constituted, one must recall, 
comprises nothing like the ntne-to-three centre-right majority that one 
detects in EC govern111ents. ln votes on international political issues 
the Left will usually win, at least until after the 1989 European election.) 
The result is a serious EC/US political problem, since the America~ people 
cannot understand why a large part of the west European public feel this 
way about their sincere efforts to eradicate a terrifying Europe-based 
problem. 
The problem was complicated further in late 1986 by the revelation 
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that senior US officials had tried to recruit the Iranian goverD.D1ent as 
intermediaries in the release of hostages held in Beirut. Countries like 
Italy and Greece, which have been chastised by the United States fol" their 
"soft" approach to Arab terrorism, have been quick to point out this 
American inconsistency. 
The "Irangate" revelations encouraged the Gerl!lan government to exchange 
the suspected highjacker Muhamed Ali Hamad! for Germans held hostage in 
Beirut by extremist groupso The f11agile US/EC agreement on refusing any 
"deal" with terrorists was thereby put in jeopardy. 
Your rapporteur believes that the US and the Twelve should urgently seek 
to rebuild their accord and establish a firm approach to the terrorist 
scourge. The Hindawi case and the Paris bombings have demonstrated the 
need for European unity on this question and disillusionment with American 
policy should not be allowed to prevent such cooperation. 
United States policy towards ·central ~:rtd:lSouth America 
This aspect of President Reagan's foreign policy arouses considerable 
hostility in EC countries. It is seen, very often, as little more than 
a selfish use of military and financial strength against weaker and 
poorer neighbours. The most controversial example of this is the United 
States's attitude towards Nicaragua. 
Support for the Nicaraguan "democratic resistance", more widely known as 
the "contras", is seen in Europe as a bullying interference by a 
superpower against a small country, struggling to free itself from the 
legacy left by decades of American-supported right-wing dictatorship. 
It seems to many Europeans an hypocrisy for the United States to complain 
about Soviet aggression in Afghanistan or Libyan and Syrian terrorism, 
while at the same time sponsoring an armed group that carries out acts 
of violence designed to destabilise a nearby government, one moreover 
with which the US preserves diplomatic relations. 
The United States may well have violated international law by its mining 
of Nicaraguan ports, an act for which it was condemned by the international 
court in The Hague. An American citizen, Eugene Hasenfus, has been 
convicted of supplying arms to the "contras" and it seems likely that 
other Americans are so engaged, with the knowledge and approval of the 
US government. Such heavy-handed behaviour, many believe, has encouraged 
hard-liners in the Sandinista regime, hindering its development towards 
a gentler type of democratic socialism. 
By financing the "contras", it is said, the United States undermines its 
own diplomatic influence in Nicaragua and neighbouring countries, 
irritating and embarrassing the friendly governments of Honduras, El 
Salvador, Guatemala andCesta Rica. It fol'ces them into an agonisi'.!'g 
choice, either to quarrel with their provider - in the two years 1984-85 
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they received a total of $1,800 million in US aid - or to betray a 
fellow-Hispanic neighbour at the behest of the "yanqui" overlord. 
forces Nicaragua in.to even closer ties with the only two countries 





The United States should therefore change its policy, abandon armed 
intervention and support the initiative put forward by Mexico, Panama, 
Colombia and Venezuela on the island of Contadora in January 1983. The 
Contadora initiative, backed as it is by the 12 EC members as well as by 
the five Central American countries and the South American "support 
group" consisting of Brazil, Uruguay, Peru and Argentina, has the best 
chance of bringing democracy to Nicaragua and ending her isolation. 
The view taken by many socialists in the Community is even stronger. 
They feel that the Sandinista movement is the way of the future in Latin 
America, an example to all countries in the region of how to escape from 
United States hegemony, and that its excesses, such as they are, are the 
result of the US government's imperialist poU cies and the CIA' s crimes. 
The European Left supports similar movements in El Salvador and 
Guatemala, whose governments they see as gross violators of human rights. 
Most EC governments agree that the Sandinistas ought to be influenced 
and restrained, but they are committed to doing this diplomatically, 
through the Contadora process. They reject, or do not take part in, the 
othe~ aspect of the US "twin-track" policy, the sponsorship of guerilla 
fighters, In spite of some efforts, the Reagan administration has not 
been able to rally any significant group of European political figures, 
even of the centre-right, to support the counter-revolution. 
In the western hemisphere the US is similarly isolated, Not even Chile 
supports the military dimension, at least not publicly. In :fact, US 
officials say, several Latin American governments support the "contras", 
even though they dare not admit it. They secretly believe, it is said, 
that fhoSandinistas with their 3,000 Cuban and 300 Soviet advisers really 
are a threat to the region, a "plague bacillus" that could infect the 
entire continent, and must therefore be destroyed. 
Americans detect a great naivety in the European position, They feel 
that Europeans visiting Nicaragua are too easily impressed by charades 
laid on for their benefit, for instance during the November 1984 elections, 
where a superficial show·of fairness concealed a massive suppression of 
non-MaTxist opportunity, especially in the media, 
'!'hey point to the size of the Nicaraguan army, 75,000 men, more than the 
al'lllies of Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica put together. Equipped 
with the ~ost up-to~date Soviet weaponry, including helicopter gunships, 
it seems far bigger than necessary. It is led by nine "comandantes", 
all of them Marxists, and it is they who effectively rule the country. 
It is therefore, by any definition, a communist military dictatorstiip., 
Non-Marxist political forces, including the Catholic Church, are suppressed, 
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An exuple is the ~ecent exclus:t.on f;r01'l Nic";ragua of two 
Ch4rch leaders, Monsigno,.o Caballo and Bishop Pablo Vega. 
such as the Meskito Indians, have been persecuted. 
p;rominent 
R~cial minorities, 
In the past year.the rule of the "comandantes" has become even harsher, 
it is said. A state of emergency was imposed in October 1985. 
Demonstrations and strikes were banned. The right to appeal and habeus 
corpus were suspended. Later the Church"$ radio station was closed, as 
was ~~~re~, the only significant opposition newspaper. 
Today non-Sandinista parties still exist, with seats in parliament, but 
the most valuable local foruin, the outdoor rally, is denied them. They 
may only meet indoors and those who attend are harassed by police. More 
and more restrictions are placed on trade unions and on the private 
sector of the economy. The Parliament has lost power, with important 
laws being decreed by the nine "comandantes". 
These measures have made many Europeans, including such socialist leaders 
as Spanish prime minister Felipe Gonzales, disillusioned with the Sandinista 
experiment. To this extent European parliamentary opinion is following the 
American path. Five years ago there were llallY pro-Sandinista US congressmen. 
Today, in spite of the acute difference of view over support for the 
"contras", there is virtual unanimity in Congress on the disagreeable 
nature of the Nicaraguan regime. 
In such circu111Stances, US officials point out, it is not surprising that 
support for the democratice resistance has grown, until it has an, 
estimated 20,000 men under arms, about 20 percent of them former Sandinista 
supporters. (The proportion of former pro-Somoza national guard supporters 
is put at 27 percent.) The resistance is a people's legitimate struggle 
against dictatorship and, as such, it is supported financially by the 
United States. Congress has voted $100 million, $60 million of which was 
paid in October 1986, with $40 million to be paid in February 1987. 
President Reagan is proposing $105 million in "contra" funding for the 
1988 budget. 
The "contras" are thus an essential ele111ent in the American plan to 
overthrow the Sandinistas, or at least bring them to the bargaining table. 
The Contadora process is all very well, Americans say, but it will not 
do the job by itself. Diplomatic and economic pressure are, by themselves, 
not enough. Military pressure must be used also. 
This is the difference of view between the Reagan administration and the 
EC governments. The Twelve will pursue the Contadora line at foreign 
minister level with 13 Latin Ame~ican governments in Guatemala in 
February 1987. They will not support the "contras" and they doubt whether 
their pressure will make much impact on the undoubted Sandinista dr.ift 
towards totalitarian Marxist rule. They suspect too that American support 
for the "contras'' may well weaken in the last phase of Mr Reagan's 
presidency, in which he will control neither house of Congress and will 
- 22 - PE 111.206/fin. 
be car:rying the burden o:f the 11a1'l!ls ;for Iran'' scandal. He may well not 
have the votes needed to provide further financial help. 
The EC hope that, if the Sandinistas cannot be overthrown, they can at 
least be contain$d within the small country of Nicaragua. The aim should 
therefore be to isolate or "albanianise" them by economic and political 
pressure from the rest of the region, so that in the end they become a 
bad investment :from the Soviet point of view and are forced to seek 
better relations with non-Marxist countries. 
Until this happens, though, the Sandinista regime will contine to pose 
serious problems for the US administration, not the least of which is 
the reaction of European public opinion to what appears, superficially at 
least, as a typical example of American heavy-handedness. 
American government supporters cannot understRl'ld these attitudes •. They 
feel that, whatever may have happened in the past, their recent record in 
Latin America is admirable. US influence has helped to reduce army power 
throughout the continent, persuading countries along the road to 
pluralism and reconciliation. In Argentina, Peru, Brazil and Uruguay the 
army is off its pedestal,., parliamentary democracy (albeit of an imperfect 
type) has reappeared and for this the US government claims some credit. 
In Central America, they beleive, their influence has been even more 
important, For instance, the cut-off of military aid to Guatemala in the 
mid-1970s was an important reason why the army there finally agreed to 
hold elections. And, while human rights violations undoubtedly still 
occur, opponents no longer "disappear" in large numbers. 
New parliamentary democracies are still being propped up with American 
11101,ey. In the past year the United States has given $435 million to El 
Salvador, $200 million to Costa Rica, $182 million to Honduras and $80 
million to Guatemala. 
A US official says_, "There are 30 countries in the western hemisphere. A 
few ~ears ago most of them were dictatorships. Now there are only five 
dictatorships, two of the right and three of the left: Chile, Paraguay, 
Cuba, Surinam and Nicaragua. And I predict that both Chile and Paraguay 
will be democracies in this century." 
US officials are at pains to explain to west Europeans their good 
intentions in the region and their legitimate concerns. The situation in 
Mexico causes them particular alarm. Ohe of the least democratic states 
in the continent, effectively ruled by a one-party system, Mexico suffers 
severe economic and social problems, which are made worse by the instability 
of Guatemala along Mexico'~ southern border and which already spill over 
the northern border into the United States. Drugs and illegal immigration 
are two of the problems. An estimated 10,000 people enter the United 
States illegally every day. 
Americans resent the fact that, while they are required by treaty to 
defend western Europe, they are expected also to cure the instability and 
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poverty o;f the ent:tro An,.erican continent 
European support or rciympti,thy. They know 
think they are doing theit' best to help. 
to understand and coope;rate. 
- without any significant 
they cannot do this, but they ·,; 
They would like western Europe 
The EC is in a good positio:P to do so. Christian Democrats and the 
Socialist International have good party ties with many Latin American 
countries, The accession of Latin Al!lerica's two mother countries, Spain 
and Portugal, has provided a further bridge. Central and South America 
111ay not be western Europe's "back yard'\ but it is a region of enormous 
size, wealth and importa11.ce, with equally enormous problems. If it 
becomes the cause of political tension between the United States and the 
European Community, these problems will be exaccerbated. 
pnite2 Sta~and European Perceptions ·of'South Afri~~-
us policy towards South Africa has, since the recent outbreak of 
violence,:,been broadly i.n line with that of the European Community. In 
America and western Europe there is agreement on the need to reject 
apartheid and work out a system where all South Africans share power. On 
both si.des of the Atlantic the first step towards a solution is seen as 
the release of politi.cal prisoners, including Nelson Mandela, and the 
beginnincr ·of talks between the Government and all political groupings, 
including the African National Congress, on a fair system of government. 
In September 1985 both the US and the EC announced a series of measures 
against South Africa. The US administration issued an executive order 
banning any sale to South Africa of nuclear and computer products as 
well as the purchase of Krugerrands and bank loans to government agencies. 
The EC agreed on a nUJ11ber of "positive, and negative measures", including 
a ban on new nuclear sales and grants of funds to train black South 
Africans for positions of responsibility. 
The EC has its Code of Conduct, under which Community enterprises in South 
Africa undertake to provide equal opportunity to all their employees, 
irrespective of race. They repm·t regularly on what steps they are taking 
as regards pay, promotion, fringe benefits and recreation. The aim is to 
remove apartheid, whether at the place of work or in eating and leisure 
activities, from EC-owned business in South Africa. 
The US equivalent is the Sullivan Code. American f~rms must not only 
do away with racial discrimination, but also promote labour laws and 
responsible trade unionism. EC and US both ho1ieve that recent trade 
union reform in South Africa has taken pl <1, :: ;;;, i' t.:t y as a result of their 
pressure. 
Di f!erences arise mainly over econom:lc ~a~ct';I.Ql'ls,, on whether the EC ,and 
US should cease trading with South Africa, withdrawing its investments 
and closing its gates to South Africa's products. Generally npeaking, 
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the US Congreu',s appl'Oach to this •atte:r is tough and Jllilitant. A recent 
Bill approved by both hou~es will impose a list of sanctions additional 
to those of September 1985~ including a ban on flights into US by South 
African Airways. Prel!lident Reagan was against these further measures, 
but he cannot now prevent their implementation. 
The US Congress's tough stance is the result of electoral pressure and it 
manifests itself most strongly when Congressional elections are illllDinent, 
as they were back in the SU1111Der and autUlln of 1986. Many Americans, 
especially black Americans, see the anti-apartheid struggle as a sequel 
to their own battle for civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, many 
believe that South Africa is no longer a marginal passing issue in American 
politics, but that it will be a matter of permanent concern to a black 
ethnic lobby, just as the Middle East is to Jewish Americans, East-West 
relations to Polish or Ukrainian Americans and Cyprus to Greek Americans. 
Therefore, whereas the Administration is alive to the complications of 
South African politics, the danger of a take-over by extreme leftists in 
the ANC and the reliance of the West on South African raw materials, 
Congressmen and Senators are moved mainly ··by1 the simple need to do away 
with injustice, or at least to preserve their electoral support by being 
seen to play no part in perpetuating it. 
Europeans tend to be more familiar with the South African problem. 
Britain, Germany, the Netherlands and Portugal have historical ties with 
the region. Many Portugese moved to South Africa after Angola and 
Mozambique became independent. An estimated li million white South Africans 
have the right to enter and live in a west European country. 
Foreign investment in South Africa is likewise overwhelmingly European. 
Forty percent of it is British, 30 percent from the rest of the EC and 
only 20 percent An,erican. Any collapse of the· :south African economy and 
political system would, therefore, have a serious effect on some EC 
countries. It would cause sudden large-scale immigration and additional 
unemployment. In other EC countries, for instance Den.mark and Greece, the 
effect would be very small. In the United States it would be insignificant. 
Still, in spite of these different perceptions, neither the EC nor the US 
has any long-tel"lll interest in prolonging the unjust apartheid system, 
quite apart fro~ moral considerations. Their joint aim must therefore 
be to encourage a transfer of power, without bloodshed, to a government 
which, while remaining friendly to the West, represents all South Africa's 
people. However unlikely it may seem that this aim can ever be realised, 
the EC and US would be well advised to try their utmost to achieve it. 
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United States·. and ,EC, policy· on ·human ...rights 
-------------~-·---....-.--. ... er: ... ' • ·~ . ' • '" I\ 
The European Community and United States enjoy a common commitment 
to human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in the United 
Nations Declaration and the two covenants that derive from it. 
They have a further responsibility as signatories to the CSCE Final 
Act, a document of particular concern to the Community since 33 
of the 35 signatories are European. At the presnt Vienna review 
conference western Europe works closely with the US both jointly 
in the NATO conte~t and bilaterally through EC-US talks. 
Human rights in the US government is more codified and structured 
than in the EC governments. In 1976 the US Congress first required 
the State Department to report to it annually about the human rights 
record of countries receiving American aid. Aid was then refused 
to any country that was below standard. Guatemala and Argentine 
were examples of countries refused their "certificate" on human 
rights grounds. Shortly afterwards the State Department was obliged 
to report on every country's record and this they do in a thick 
book published at the end of January every year. 
This has had an important bureaucratic effect on the State Department. 
Every US embassy now has its "human rights officer", whose duty 
it is to provide Washington with information for the annual report. 
These officers have become familiar with human rights problems. 
Their interest in the subject encourages them nowadays to send 
regular cables to Washington on the subject, so making it more 
important to the US government. 
The State Department fulfils these duties by means of its Human 
Rights Unit, 50 foreign service officers who work full time in 
Washington digesting the input from missions abroad, dealing with 
Pnqu i ri ns from the public and Congress and preparing the report. 
They also process requests for political asylum. (There were 16,622 
such requests in the year ending September 1985.) 
Your rapporteur believes that this provides an excellent means 
for elected representatives to raise human rights issues at government 
level and that the framework is one that the EP would do well to 
suggest to the EC Presidency-in-Office. 
Already the Presidency reports to the EP on human rights issues 
from time to time, either in plenary session or at the political 
committee's quarterly colloquies. In July 1986 a written text on 
human rights, drafted by the Dutch presidency, was approved by 
the Twelve foreign ministers. It would however be more effective 
if the Presidency could be persuaded to report to the EP regularly, 
on the basis of points raised by the EP in previous months. 
True dialogue on the subject could then become possible and the large 
number of EP resolutions on human rights, which presently make Little 
or no political impact, would become influential. The EP's views on 
human rights wouCd then be a factor in the Community's relations with 
third countries, including members of the lome CoAvention. The system 
would be an approximation of the US model. 
Differences of perception on human rights between ~C and US will 
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continue, for instance over US influence in Central and South America. 
Another matter brought to your Rapporteur's attention is the United 
States's continued use of the death penalty. 
In 1972 the US Supreme Court nullified all existing death sentences 
on the ground that, in most states, death penalty laws were being 
applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Four years later, 
however, the Supreme Court allowed states to reinstate the death 
penalty, provided that new laws were passed that followed proper 
guidelines. 
Since then 38 states have reintroduced such laws and a large number 
of prisoners have been sentenced to death. At the end of 1984 there 
were 1,464 prisoners under sentence of death and 21 were executed 
during the year. At least two men, Charles Rumbaugh in 1985 and 
Terry Roach in 1986, have been executed for crimes committed when 
they were 17 years old. 
Bearing in mind the fact that the death penalty has not been applied 
in EC countries for many years and that the EP has expressed its 
opposition to it on principle, the EP may wish to include a paragraph 
in its Resolution calling for an end to the use of the death penalty 
in the United States. 
One must however recall that such a measure could not be enacted 
by the US administration. The death penalty laws are passed by 
the individual states and only by an amendment to the US Constitution 
could the death penalty be abolished throughout the entire country. 
Your Rapporteur hopes that, in spite of these differences of view, 
the EP will confirm the Community's desire to work closely with 
the United States in human rights matters. 
Rec:iproci ty over EC and· US visitors 1. visas 
~------------------------------------~--------~-~ 
Under present regulations US citizens may enter EC countries (except, 
for the moment, France) as visitors without obtaining a visa. EC 
citizens all need visas before entering the United States. West 
Europeans are sometimes irritated by this imbalance and the EP 
has for some years tried to rectify it by raising it repeatedly 
at the meetings with US Congressmen. 
In November 1986 the US Congress, after several failed attempts, 
passed an Immigration Bill which included a pilot scheme to waive 
the visa requirement for certain non-US nationals. Eight countries 
will be chosen and in due course, probably in 1988, the Secretary 
of State will decide which they will be. 
In order to qualify for the scheme, the country's citizens must 
havo a less-than-two-percent refusal rate in their applications 
for US visas and a similarly low rate of violations of their te~ms 
of entry. The country must also accord visa-free access to US citizens 




trip air ticket refundable only in the country of origin. 
The eight countries will be selected only when the Immigration 
Service, under the Department of Justice, has certified to the 
President that an effective means exists for policing the scheme. 
About 25-30 countries will qualify for selection, among them Japan, 
which provides by far the largest number of visitors to the us. 
More than 800,000 visas were issued to Japanese in 1985. In order 
to qualify, though, Japan would have to reciprocate by offering 
visa-free entry to Americans. EC countries do this already. 
West Europeans are the next most frequent US visitors. In 1985 
more than a million visas were issued to EC citizens: about 372,000 
to the United Kingdom, 246,000 to Germany, 175,000 to France and 
103,000 to Italy. Also, many Europeans travel to the US on visas 
issued in previous years. In 1981 more than a million visas were 
issued to UK citizens alone, most of them valid indefinitely. 
Several EC countries will, it is expected, be included in the visa-
waiver pilot project. The State Department will, however, have 
to make invidious choices and countries not included may be offended. 
This is why your Rapporteur wishes that the scheme could be applied 
to all the 25-30 countries that qualify, especially since this 
number will probably include all 12 EC members. 
A further problem is the US entry ban on anyone who is or has ever 
been a communist. All such persons, even EP members on official. 
delegations, must obtain an individual "waiver" from the government 
before being allowed into the United States. There is also, though 
it is very seldom enforced, a similar ban on homosexuals. Your 
Rapporteur would like to see the repeal of such discriminatory 
laws. 
Cheaper air travel has brought the transatlantic holiday within 
the range of many millions. Such contacts help EC-US mutual interest 
and understanding. Your Rapporteur would like to see the end of 
artificial barriers to such contacts: the removal of France's visa 
requirement on US and other non-EC citizens, the disappearance 
of American ideas on the supposed dangers of European travel and 
visa-free tourist travel to the US for all people whose fellow-
countrymen do not significantly violate American law. 
CONCLUSION 
The impression gained by your Rapporteur both in Washington and. 
in EC capitals confirms the view that EC-US political relations 
remain, in spite of the problems mentioned above, remarkably good. 
In recent months quarrels over trade, for instance in steel and 
certain foodstuffs, have been satisfactorily resolved. EC-US financial 
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problems also seem to have eased. (These matters are dealt with 
in reports prepared by other EP committees.) None of the outstanding 
political issues between EC and US is so serious as to amount to 
any immediate threat. 
There are, however, signs of worse to come. Many Americans are 
resentful of western Europe's independent stances on certain issues. 
A difference of view may be seen as a sign of unfriendliness or 
disloyalty, whereas in fact it is little more than the adolescence 
of European unity. Americans react too, with more justification, 
when European writers or politicians put them on the same moral 
level as the Soviet Union. They deserve better than this, they 
feel, in view of our shared democratic values, our military alliance 
and for having helped us so generously in the recent past. 
They recall a time when democratic socialists in western Europe 
were as firm as their centre-right adversaries in support for the 
Alliance and in opposition to Soviet influence. They read now that 
the British Labour Party intends closing US nuclear bases, that 
the German SPD envisages withdrawal from NATO's military structure, 
that Spain makes problems over continued American use of the Rota 
naval base and that Greece proposes to close all US bases completely. 
"Why do our allies behave in this way?" they ask themselves. "What 
has happened to western Europe's pro-American consensus? Why are 
we suddenly so controversial?" 
They then begin to ask themselves whether it makes sense to maintain 
such a firm and expensive commitment to their "so--called European 
allies", whether it would make sense to shift some of this commitment 
to the Pacific basin, where US economic interests are quickly expanding, 
while links with Europe are becoming little more than historical, 
cultural and emotional. 
True, they recognise western Europe's technological capability 
and they would not want this to fall into Soviet hands, but otherwise 
links with Europe are not a necessity, either economically or 
militarily. Europeanism comes from the American heart rather than 
from its head and the real world lies to the West. In other words, 
the US President is still "a Berliner", as President Kennedy was, 
but only just, and it would not take much to bring this protective 
arrangement to an end. 
In the European Community, mainly but not exclusively on the political 
Left, doubts and resentments are just as strong. US policy, locally 
in Central America and globally in the superpower conflict, seems 
bellicose and dangerous, taking little account of Europe's vulnerability 
to Soviet anger and nuclear devastation on a scale that does not 
threaten the United States. Such critics see President Reagan as 
a posturing ideologue, obsessed with the communist menace and 
insensitive to pleas for caution. 
European Leftist and "Green" parties owe much of their support 
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to such feelings. However, there is also in some EC countries a 
growing feeling that the Community should as soon as possible, 
in its own interest, go even further and cut the umbilical cord 
with the New World entirely. 
'rhis view, which may be termed the "mega-Gaullist heresy", is based· 
on the idea that the EC will never achieve unity or prosperity, 
that it will always be the "poor relation" in terms of economic 
and political influence, so long as it remains under US protection. 
The EC should therefore assume a middle position between the 
superpowers, expand its trade with the Soviet bloc, exploit to 
the full its ties with the Third World, which for historical reasons 
are better than those either of the US or the USSR, take responsibility 
for its own security, with the help of French and British nuclear 
forces, and so build up its independent strength. 
It is argued in support of this theory that an EC independent of 
the us, though anxious to maintain good relations and trade with 
both superpowers, would be a reassurance to the Soviet Union. The 
EC would then be able to negotiate the withdrawal of both superpowers' 
military forces from western and central Europe. The way would 
be paved for greater EC influence in the Mediterranean and greater 
democracy in central Europe. Eventually, there would be no obstacle 
to German reunification. 
Such ideas, in their entirety, may seem unrealistic and, if ever 
implemented, dangerously destabilising. They do nevertheless lurk 
in the minds of many EC forward-thinkers and they should, in your 
Rapporteur's view, be discussed frankly, since they reflect many 
Europeans' frustration over what they see as their over-dependence 
on the United States. 
A far more likely outcome, and one that appeals far more to your 
Rapporteur, is a slow development of EC unity, leading to a stronger 
EC economy and, eventually, an alliance of equals between EC and 
us. As movement towards European Union proceeds, there will be 
tensions in the EC-US relationship, but these will be overcome 
because of our common interests. 
It is to be hoped that the United States, although it will often 
be irritated by west European rebelliousness, will look kindly 
on the EC as it goes through this difficult phase, while at the 
same time the EC learns to understand the concerns of the great 
power, its own child, which has looked after its parents generously 
for nearly half a century. 
In this way the Ee and US ought to be able to maintain their close 
family relationship. 
----------------------
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOCUMENT 2-551/84) 
tabled by Mr EPHREMIDIS, Mr ADAMOU and Mr ALAVANOS 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
~n t~~-dangers for E~rope implicit in the resolution passed by the 
epu ,can Congress 1n the USA and the behaviour ot President Reagan 
The European Parliam~nt, 
A. concerned et the att;tudes towards the ••jor problem of detente and 
armaments expressed ;n the political resolution of the Republican 
Party Congress in Dallas, Texas wh;ch depart from the broadly accepted 
principles of balance and equal security for all sides, 
B. whereas the view expressed in the Republican programme, that Europe 
will be defended by making the USA more powerful than any potential enemy, 
implies, while signalling the adoption of an attitude of superiority, grave 
dangers for world peace and, in particular, peace in Europe where the 
balance of nuclear and conventional weapons confronting each other make it 
the most critical area in the world, 
C. deeply concerned also at President Reagan's notorious radio announcement 
about the destruction of Russia in 5 minutes, 
D. stressing that this resolution has no bearing on electoral procedures in 
the USA and noting that the Republican Party and President Reagan are 
meddling dangerously ,n issues affecting the very survival of the peoples 
of lurope, 
1. Strongly protests at the views of the Republican programme and the aimless 
and dangerous words of the president of one of the countries whose policy is 
of crucial importance for Europe's future in the world; 
2. Expresses its strong belief in reducing arms to the lowest possible level 
on the basis of the principle of equal security for all sides, disarmament 
and detente, which is the only policy that can guarantee peace in Europe; 
3. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Foreign Ministers 
meeting in political coop?ration, the governments of the Member States and 
the government of the USA. 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOCUMENT 2-741/84) 
tabled by Mr GLINNE 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Pr·ocNJure 
on the implementation of the McCarran-Walter Act in the 
United States 
Tht Curoptan Parliaatnt, 
A - whtreas ·11nct 1952, Many foreigner, wiah;ng to visit the Unittd Stitt, havf 
bten refused a visa under the "cCarran-Walttr Act on tht b111, of their 
political vhws, 
B - whereas ••ny writtr1, 1tudtnt1 and ,ci•nti,t, have been affected by th~se 
eea,urts, including Gabriel Garcia "arqutz, winner of the Nobel Pri2e for 
literature, Oario fo, Italian dirtctor and actor, and ~ortensi1 Allende, 
widow of the 11,1,1in1ted Chilean President, 
C - wherea, since the beginning of the year, a large nuabtr of public figures and 
••~bera ot Congre,1 have been urging a ceapa1gn for the revi,ion ot this Act, 
1. Calls on the foreign "in11ttr1 •••tino in political cooperation to urge the 
United Statu Governaent to rtviu and liberalize Anitritan 1111111ior1tion la.:s; 
2. Urge, that European legislation be revlaed if tht Amer,c,n 1 .... i9rition 
•uthorlt its •aintain their rtQuirt~tnt that nationals of EEC Member States 
muH obtain a viu: it is not right that national, of the Uniteo States 
should be allow~d to enter Eurcpe without• visa whilst Europtans crossing 
the Atl•ntic •rt forced to obtain on•; 
3. ln,trvcts 1t1 Pre,id•nt to forw•rd this reaolution to tht foreign ~ini,ttrs 
o1 tht EEC, tht Council of Minist•r• al'\d to the Un1ttd Statt, Congress. 
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